Query: In analyzing “Dissent, Inc.,” Collins and Skover assert: “The character of dissent is sometimes buttressed by its associational nature.” How is it evident that collective action, including corporate action, may be vital to amplification of the individual voice of dissent?

Query: Given that dissent in its collective form certainly has advantages, does it also have disadvantages?Does the collective form, particularly the for-profit corporate form, devalue the currency of dissent? If so, why? If not, why not?

Query: The text identifies two looming issues regarding for-profit corporate dissent: the collective intent problem and the collective legitimacy requirement. Do you consider either of these issues to seriously undermine the possibility for and operation of for-profit corporate dissent?

Query: Collins and Skover inquire: “Can dissent endure when collective intent and purpose appear to be tied to profit making?” Elaborating on the inquiry, they identify the most relevant issue as the primary profit problem: that is, the disinclination to find dissent “if the primary purpose behind a message is profit making.” How do you respond to this inquiry and the primary profit problem?

Query: Considering the corporate commercial exploitation of aesthetic dissent, Collins and Skover distinguish “the instrumental use of a product to express dissent and its aesthetic use to express one’s unconventionality or aberrational preferences.” And they ask several probing questions: “Does dissent have to be instrumental, or can it be merely self-expressive? Put differently, can dissent ever meaningfully be an aesthetic or stylistic choice of self-expression?” How would you approach these questions and answer them for yourself? Are you more (a) in the camp of Todd Gitlin, Kent Greenawalt, and Fred Schauer, (b) in the camp of Howard Zinn and Geoffrey Stone, or (c) in the camp of Steven Shiffrin? What explains your choice, and how do you, nonetheless, preserve an operative and meaningful notion of dissent?

Query: Collins and Skover claim that “it is important to recognize that the relationship between dissent and the First Amendment is more opaque than one might first perceive." Why might this be so? Of what significance is this observation?

Query: Collins and Skover argue that there is a “functional relationship” between dissent and the First Amendment. Describe that phenomenon and explain, at a general level of abstraction, how it appears to work. Why might it be fairly claimed that “this is the work that philosophy does (how we define or speak of dissent) when acting in tandem with the First Amendment (how legislatures and courts go about protecting dissent).”

Query: Consider the examples that Collins and Skover provide to clarify the functional relationship between dissent and the First Amendment: (1) student dissent (e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District); (2) dissenting defamation (e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan); (3) dissenting advocacy of illegal action (e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio); (4) dissenting flag desecration (e.g., Texas v. Johnson); (5) dissenting economic boycotts (e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Company). How are these examples illustrative of the “functional relationship” between dissent and the First Amendment addressed in the previous question? Are there other examples that similarly demonstrate that phenomenon? Considering the observation of Nadine Strossen, are there examples of today’s criminalized speech activities that may well be tomorrow’s First Amendment rights?

Query: Collins and Skover posit: “Beyond the First Amendment and its state counterparts, two other legal doctrines have occasionally succeeded in legitimizing dissent that originally was the focus of criminal or civil constraints:” the voice-for-vagueness doctrine and the necessity defense. Explain how these two jurisprudential devices may assist in moving dissent across the line from lawlessness to lawfulness.

Query: Not only might “crimes of dissent” be sheltered by constitutional and ordinary law doctrines, but they may effectively be protected by the practices of a range of executive and judicial officials. Explain how and why the various links along the criminal enforcement chain may buttress the causes of dissent.

Query: Consider the narrative on Thomas Paine, the Great Dissenter. In what respects might you conclude that this account is a paradigm of the shifting fortunes of a dissenter?

Query:“Sedition can be the best test of loyalty. Heresy can be the truest expression of faith. And dissent can be the highest form of patriotism.” How might such claims fairly be laid?