B.  Briefly Put

In late February of 1926, Ruthenberg’s lawyers filed their brief for plaintiff in error in the United States Supreme Court.^[103]  Mindful of procedural snags, counsel for the Plaintiff in Error devoted several pages to establishing federal jurisdiction based on what had been expressly claimed at various stages of the case.  Before proceeding to the specific “errors intended to be charged,” the brief stressed the issue of imminence:

Under the interpretation of the statute given to the jury, it made no difference that the assembly at Bridgman did not then and there advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism. . . .  It is enough that somewhere and [sometime] there had been formed a party to teach and advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism, and that this meeting at Bridgman “was called and for the purpose of promoting, carrying out and furthering the fundamental general designs and objects of the party.” (emphasis in original)

     Speaking to the last point, Walsh et al emphasized that the “record presents, in a general way, three versions of the doctrines of the Communist Party.”  One of those doctrines (“Marxian theories”) was largely philosophical, while another (derived from isolated passages selected from isolated documents collected by the prosecution) was deceptively inflammatory, while yet another version of Communist Party doctrine (proffered by the defense) was innocently organizational.  If indeed, there were three versions of Communist doctrine, the defense argued, could the State select one, ignore the others, and proceed to convict Ruthenberg without violating his right to due process?