V. MODERN FREE-SPEECH ANALYSIS: THINKING BEYOND THE "WAR" PARADIGM
After "mastering" the wartime cases, every First Amendment student is introduced to the "tool-kit"96 associated with modern free speech methodology. That kit includes analytical tools such as contemporary interpretations of the overbreadth97 and vagueness 98 doctrines, the "public forum" doctrine99 , the content discrimination restriction,100 and the prior restraint prohibition.101 But what if the order of study in casebooks were the other way around? What if students were primed to analyze the constitutionality of wartime speech codes using the tool-kit rather than the Schenck/Brandenburg doctrines? Such an approach might be instructive not only for students, but also for litigators and jurists.
Even though Schenck formally remains the law, any concern over the Schenck/Brandenburg formulations may well prove to be of collateral value. In many respects, such formulations have been eclipsed by the more recent and more speech-protective doctrines in the tool-kit. Since no First Amendment claim ever prevailed under the old wartime "clear and present danger" test, and no First Amendment claim has ever been tried in a prosecution for interfering with war efforts under the modern "imminent lawless action" test, the tool-kit may prove far more functionally useful.
Consider, for example, the Espionage Act of 1917, as amended by the Sedition Act of 1918, that sent Molly Steimer, Jacob Abrams, Hyman Lachowsky, and Samuel Lipman to prison for fifteen to twenty-year terms.102 They were convicted for violating the following provision of that Act: