Necessary Lies of Radical Feminists?
What kind of argument against pornography can be made in a culture which trades in images of sexual pleasure, traffics in the commerce of endless amusement, and trumpets individualism as the governing ideology? Put another way, what kind of Brandeis brief might prevail in the approaching pornographic state? Since the sexual revolution of the 1960s, America's libidinal appetites have been unleashed and largely unaffected by regimes calling for civic decency. Accordingly, the moral argument against patently offensive erotica has been unable to carry the day even under the Burger and Rehnquist Courts and the Reagan and Bush administrations. Meanwhile, an emerging feminist movement has often scrutinized maledominated pornography with a critical eye while distancing itself from conservative moralism. What anti pornography feminists needed was a striking argument for selfrestraint and societal regulation, one that might win approval in a pleasurebent commercial culture. Heed their rising voices:
Collectively, these and scores of other like charges present an argument that may be compelling even in today's culture: pornography must be prohibited to the extent that it is the embodiment and the cause of personal harms. 115 There are, however, counterarguments that may be equally or more compelling:
Essentially, these counterarguments challenge the validity of the antipornography harm principle. Inferentially, the critics invite us to ask: Can it be that the radical feminists are perpetuating their own necessary lie? Is it possible that their harm principle is purposefully more rhetorical than analytical? And, if so, is intentional resort to their noble lie a critical diversionary tactic in a culture otherwise charmed by erotica's excesses?