The Modernist's First Amendment in Bold Relief

What is latent in Redish's modernist scenario is manifest in Professor Edward Rubin's version of this scenario: "Huxley's vision [is] more prescient for our society"' than Orwell's. ⁹ Moreover, Rubin is not troubled by the collapse of self­realization into self­gratification. For Rubin, as we interpret his response, the essence of first­amendment political action in the commercial amusement culture is to elect to watch television together; this "may be the average person's most important political act."' ¹⁰

Surely, this admission must be disconcerting to modernists of the Redish ilk. Ultimately, Rubin vindicates the modern scenario for a libertarian first amendment, but on terms that the modernist typically does not countenance. Rubin argues that the primary value of the first amendment is not democratic self­governance or heightened self­realization: indeed, we are individuals intent on self­amusement who exercise our freedom as political animals to choose what television program to watch. Understandably, then, Rubin's paradigm is not Athens; it is Huxley's soma tablet dispensary.

Again, the modern first amendment is cast into bold relief. To borrow from Rubin: "The participatory ideal of citizens who inform themselves, engage in lively debate, and make their views known to those in power is outmoded."' ¹¹ In short, "participation is not really a basic value in our normative scheme."' ¹² If this characterization appears odd, it is only so in light of the Orwellian perspective of the modernist first amendment, and not in light of the Huxleyan perspective of the "postmodernist"' first amendment. ¹³